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servicing  was  resumed.  Bolivia  finally  declared  a  moratorium  to  the 
commercial banks in mid-1984. 
Bolivia  was  able  to  get  some  debt  alleviation  more  easily  with  two 
bilateral creditors: Brazil  and  Argentina.  A  total  of  U.S.$716  million of 
short-term debt  and  principal on  medium-term  debt  was  refinanced  with 
those countries in  1983 on relatively easy terms: a fixed interest rate of  8 
percent, maturities between 8 and  10 years,  and grace periods of  3 years. 
This scheme of refinancing was found acceptable by  the Bolivian public and 
did  not  provoke  the  kind  of  criticism  that  the  rescheduling  with  the 
commercial banks  had  received.  The  international organizations,  on  the 
contrary,  objected  to  the  status  of  “preferred  creditor”  that  Argentina 
received because it was  able to use the natural gas exports of  Bolivia  as 
collateral. 
5.7  Developments After 1985 
In chapter 8 we provide a detailed analysis of Bolivia’s debt renegotiations 
after 1985. The main point that can be mentioned here is that the government 
under President Paz  took a very different approach to negotiations. Having 
inherited a unilateral suspension of payments on the bank debt from the Siles 
government,  the  Paz  administration maintained the  suspension and began 
negotiations with the banks addressed to a long-term solution to the crisis 
instead of  another rescheduling. Some results were achieved in 1988 when 
Bolivia  was  able to retire approximately one-half  of  its commercial bank 
debt at a price of  11 cents per dollar. In 1989, more debt was retired and 
negotiations  continued  on  the  remaining  debt  that  had  not  yet  been 
repurchased. 
6 
The  inflation  in 
The Emergence of 
Hyperinflation, 1982-85 
Bolivia  in  1984 and  1985 was  the  most  rapid  in  Latin 
American history up  to that date and one of  the highest in world history.’ 
During the first half of  1985, the inflation surged to an annual rate of  about 
26,000 percent  (approximately 60 percent per  month),  and  it  reached  an 
annual rate of  60,000 percent during May-August  1985. As shown in table 
6.1, the inflation was brought under control in the second half of  1985, and 
then after a sharp jump in prices in January 1986, inflation was kept at low 226  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 6.1  Monthly Inflation Rates, 1984-87 
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Sources:  1/84-9/86, from national statistics; 10/86- 12/87, from IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
‘Note  that prices actually stop rising by September 9, though because of rapid inflation in August and the first 
week of  September, September’s average price level is 56.5 percent higher than in August. 
double-digit rates for the next three years. Since the Bolivian inflation is one 
of the only cases since 1950 of  a “true”  hyperinflation (by Cagan’s classic 
definition  of  monthly  inflation  exceeding  50  percent),  it  provides  an 
important testing  ground for alternative views  of  the  dynamics of  hyper- 
inflation and of the design of  anti-inflation programs.’ 
6.1  Origins of the Hyperinflation 
The  proximate  cause  of  the hyperinflation is  the  government’s loss  of 
international creditworthiness in the early 1980s. We  have noted that during 
the period 1975-81,  various Bolivian governments relied heavily on foreign 
borrowing to finance government expenditures. The combination of  a large 
buildup  of  international  debt  with  domestic  political  instability,  poor 
macroeconomic management, a weak tax system, and poor export prospects, 
precluded the Bolivian government from obtaining new  international loans 
after 1981. When foreign capital inflows dried up in early 1982, the govern- 
ment did not raise taxes or cut expenditures, but rather substituted domestic 
credit  expansion  for  capital  inflows  as  the  source  of  finance  for  the 
government.  The  rapid  expansion  of  the  money  supply  then  set  off  the 
inflationary process. Thus the balance of  payments played a critical role in 
the origin of  the hyperinflation, but  only insofar as  it affected the rate of 
money creation. More evidence in support of  this position is that after the 
beginning of  stabilization, a massive deterioration of the Bolivian interna- 
tional terms of trade in  1986 did not reignite the hyperinflation since under 
the new policy rules, the terms-of-trade decline did not feed into the rate of 
domestic credit expansion to the public sector. 
The substitution of  domestic credit expansion for capital inflows and the 
jump in real seignorage collection took place in the first half of 1982, almost 227  BolividChapter 6 
nine  months  before  the  Siles  government  took  office.  But  there  is  no 
evidence that the intens$cation  of  the inflation process involved a rise in 
seignorage collection after the beginning of 1982. (The simple correlation of 
inflation with the level of seignorage as a percentage of GDP is r2 = -0.001 
for the quarterly interval 1982:l to 19853.) 
The time path of seignorage relative to GDP is shown in figure 6.1. The 
figure  records  the  quarterly  seignorage  collection,  measured  relative  to 
annual GDP.  Therefore, to obtain the annual seignorage collection relative 
to GDP it is necessary to add the quarterly rates for a year. Seignorage is 
measured for each month as (M,  - M,-,),  where M is base money, and is 
then divided by  an estimate of  nominal GDP for the month.  This ratio is 
then  added  for  the  months  of  the quarter,  with  the  results  shown in  the 
figure. 
Surprisingly, it is difficult even many years later to uncover precisely the 
causes for the jump in money creation in early 1982, though the main culprit 
is  almost  surely  a  shift  in  the  environment  for  foreign  borrowing.  The 
problem with nailing down a culprit lies with the disarray of Bolivian fiscal 
data during this period, a problem we have already encountered in chapters 4 
and  5. We  noted three kinds of  problems inhibiting a clear assessment of 
the fiscal situation. First, most of  the available data cover only the central 
government (the TGN)  and  not  the  consolidated public  sector,  including 
state enterprises,  regional  corporations,  local  government,  state  develop- 
ment  banks,  etc.  This  limited coverage is  especially problematic for the 
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Fig. 6.1  Seignorage (per quarter, as percentage of annual GDP) 
Note: Annual seignorage earnings are the sum of  quarterly earnings. 
Source:  IMF, International Financial Statistics. 228  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
hyperinflation  period,  since  there  were  large  ad  hoc  transfers  among  the 
various parts of the government at that time. Second, there is great difficulty 
in  interpreting  on  an  ex  post  basis  the  accounting  of  arrears  on  debt 
repayments  during  this  period.  Third, there  were  (and remain)  significant 
disagreements  among  the  various  parts  of  the  government  about  the 
responsibility for portions of the foreign debt. At some points,  for example, 
the Central Bank repaid foreign dcbts on behalf of the TGN, which the TGN 
refused to recognize. 
With these limitations in mind, it is still possible to piece together a rough 
interpretation of the rise in seignorage in 1982. Key fiscal data for the central 
administration for 1981-84  are shown in table 6.2. Notice the important fact 
that the TGN deficit rises from an estimated 5.7 percent of GNP in  1981 to 
an estimated 22.3 percent of GNP in 1982. This increase just barely exceeds 
in magnitude the rise in expenditures on “internal  and external debt.”  Most 
or all of the  “internal  debt”  category  in this  period  reflects  Central  Bank 
repayments of foreign debt on behalf  of  the TGN, so that the jump in debt 
repayments is almost exclusively related to foreign debt. At the  same time 
that debt servicing jumps up, inflation starts to accelerate, with the result that 
real tax collections fall sharply,  from approximately 9.4 percent of GNP in 
1981 to  4.6  percent  of  GNP in  1982.  This revenue  shortfall  is  partially 
balanced by a simultaneous cut in the current and capital expenditures of the 
TGN. Notice that the combined  expenditures  on personnel,  other services, 
materials,  and  fixed  assets  fall  by  3.0 percent  of  GNP between  1981 and 
1982. 
The importance of enlarged net debt-service payments for the burgeoning 
deficit  in  1982 is  also  evident  from the  balance-of-payments  data,  which 
Table 6.2  The Evolution of Revenues and Expenditures, 1981-84  (as percentage 
of GNP) 
1981  ‘1982  1983  1984 
Revenues 
Internal taxes 































































Source: Ministry of  Planning, Bolivia. 
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unfortunately cannot be matched exactly with the budget data.  We  saw in 
table  5.5  for  1980 and  1981 that  net  resource transfers  to  Bolivia  were 
positive, meaning that net new borrowing by  the public sector exceeded the 
level  of  interest payments  on  the  public  debt.  In  1982, net  new  lending 
plummeted, so that the resource transfer to Bolivia (new loans minus interest 
payments) turned negative. As a percentage of  GNP,  net resource transfers 
toward  Bolivia shifted from 6.2 percent in  1980 to 2.9 percent in  1981, 
-2.0  percent in  1982, and  -4.6  percent in  1983. Were we  to include the 
data on short-term debt, which is not collected by the World Bank in the case 
of  Bolivia, the shift in net transfers would be even more dramatic, since an 
inflow of  short-term credits in  1980 and 1981 dried up in 1982. 
As it turns out, real seignorage collection from 1982 to mid-1985 remains 
roughly constant, averaging about 12 percent of GNP each year. This does not 
reflect a stable path of  government spending, taxes, and monetary emission 
during this period. Instead, the roughly constant seignorage collections hide 
a process of adjustment in which tax revenue collections all but collapse, while 
government spending is cut back  sharply over time in the vain attempt to 
compensate for the falling tax collections. Once again, data problems at this 
point preclude a comprehensive account of  this process. As we have men- 
tioned, while there are reasonably acceptable accounts for the central gov- 
ernment, data on the consolidated public sector is sparse. 
Nonetheless, relying  on the central administration accounts, we can see 
much of the process at work. The government depended on three main forms 
of  taxes during the period: internal taxes (mainly sales and income taxes), 
taxes on petroleum, and taxes on trade. Each of  these taxes fell sharply in 
real terms during the period.  Figure 6.2 records the collections from taxes 
during  1981-84  as  a percentage of  GNP (the category  “other”  includes 
trade taxes). Overall, revenues of  the central administration fell from more 
than 9 percent of GNP in  1979 and 1980 to just  1.3 percent of GNP in the 
first nine months of  1985, before the new  stabilization program went into 
effect (the preprogram period  in  1985 is indicated by  85.1 in the  figure). 
Upon  institution of  the  stabilization program,  tax  revenues of  the central 
administration jumped almost immediately to more than  10 percent of  GNP 
(shown as period  85.2 in  the  figure), mainly  through an  increase in  tax 
payments by  the state oil company, YPFB.  In view of the sharp decline in 
tax revenues, an increasing proportion of  the central administration deficit 
was financed through fiscal credits from the Central Bank. The proportion of 
TGN expenditures covered by TGN revenues fell from 65.6 percent in 1979 
to just 6.9 percent in the first nine months of  1985: 
1979  66%  1983  13% 
1980  60%  1984  8% 
1981  62%  1985.1  7% 
1982  17%  1985.2  134% 230  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
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Fig. 6.2  Tax revenues as a percentage of GNP (by category of tax) 
Note that the steep drop in revenues relative to expenditures in  1982 reflects 
the rise in expenditures on debt servicing in that year as well as the falling 
revenue collection. 
The reasons differ for the declines in the various kinds of taxes, and these 
reasons are  worth  stressing,  since they  help  to  explain the nature of  the 
stabilization policies finally undertaken in August 1985. The drop in internal 
taxes (mostly income and sales taxes) is most readily explained. Indexation 
of  the income tax  system was  not even attempted until  an  administrative 
change in March  1985, so that lags in  collection combined  with  high  in- 
flation reduced  the real  value  of  tax  collections substantially, in  the  way 
familiar from Tanzi (1977) and others. Many sales taxes were set at specific, 
rather than ad valorem rates, and the specific rates were adjusted with very 
long lags, if at all, and certainly not fast enough to keep up with accelerating 
prices under a hyperinflation. The decline in tariff revenues introduces some 
less conventional effects.  Throughout the entire hyperinflation period,  the 
official exchange rate was pegged by  the Central Bank and was adjusted in 
steps with long lags to the underlying inflation. As the government resorted 
increasingly to fiscal credit creation by  the Central Bank in  order to fund 
expenditures, there was a constant pressure on foreign exchange reserves at 
the official exchange rate.  Rather than maintaining a steadily depreciating 
but unified price of foreign exchange, the government maintained the official 
parity for long intervals and rationed foreign exchange. The persistent excess 
demand for foreign exchange at the official exchange rate of course resulted 
in an enormous premium for foreign exchange in an  unofficial, illegal, but 
semi-tolerated black  market. Table 6.3 shows the average premium on the 231  BolividChapter 6 
Table 6.3  Percentage Gap Between Official and Black-Market Exchange Rate, 
1980-86.  In  (quarterly average) 
1980: 1  .0  1984: I  327.4 
I1  .o  I1  69.8 
111  .o  111  309.7 
IV  .o  IV  302.7 
1981: I  .0  1985: I  330.9 
I1  .0  Il  321.0 
III  45.5  I11  798.1 
IV  68.3  IV  8.0 
1982: I  57.0  1986: 1  5.8 
U  3.5  I1  2.1 
UI  4.8  III  .5 
IV  22.0 
1983: I  116.3 
II  105.1 
111  241.8 
IV  225.4 
Source:  Ministry of  Planning,  Bolivia. 
black  market  relative  to the official  rate  on a  quarterly  basis  for  1980:l 
through 1986:3. In the month before the stabilization program, the premium 
was on the order of 1,400 percent! Since the stabilization program began, the 
exchange rate has been unified, with a small and declining deviation (which 
remains  because  of  minor  legal  and  administrative  factors)  between  the 
official rate and the now-legal parallel market rate. 
With foreign exchange rationing at the Central Bank, progressively fewer 
import transactions went through legal channels and more imports came into 
the country  via  smuggling,  outside of  tariff  control altogether.  Under Bo- 
livian law, all exporters are required to sell the foreign exchange from ex- 
port  earnings to the Central Bank  at the official exchange rate.  In  sectors 
where  smuggling was  possible,  the  sharp divergence between  the  official 
effective  rate  for  exporters  and  the  black-market  exchange  rate  made 
smuggling  a  highly  attractive  option  (the  smuggler  converts  the  foreign 
exchange earnings from exports in the black market, where the number of 
pesos  per  dollar  is  much  greater  than  at  the  official  effective  rate).  A 
trenchant illustration is provided by the example of  Peru, which, despite the 
absence  of  tin  mines,  became  a tin  exporter  in  1983-85  on the basis  of 
Bolivia’s smuggled tin. As dollar export earnings sold to the Central Bank at 
the official rate shrank markedly, the Central Bank had a diminished supply 
of dollars to sell to importers, who progressively turned to the black market 
in order to pay for their imports. The overall result was that a very high and 
apparently growing proportion of  imports in the economy went unrecorded, 
and therefore largely untaxed, during the hyperinflation period. 
The story of  YPFB tax collections is related. Just as the official price of 
foreign exchange lagged the domestic price inflation, so too the government 
altered  the  domestic  price  of  petroleum  products  with  a  significant  lag. 232  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Indeed, petroleum prices were typically changed at the same time that the 
official exchange rate was devalued. As an example, consider the domestic 
price of a liter of gasoline, converted to U.S. dollars using the black-market 
exchange rate (the rate earned, incidentally, by smugglers who carried cheap 
petroleum from Bolivia to Peru  across Lake Titicaca). During this period, 
the  world  market  price  was  between  $0.25  and  $0.28  per  liter,  but  the 
domestic price was as shown in table 6.4. 
Thus, on the eve of  the stabilization program (which raised the internal 
petroleum prices to world levels), the internal price of petroleum was about 
one-sixth to  one-seventh of  the world  market  price.  YPFB  was  obligated 
throughout the hyperinflation period to pay  taxes to the central government 
on a percentage of  its revenues from internal sales and external sales. With 
internal prices so depressed, the taxes on  internal sales were  also severely 
depressed. Moreover, because its profits on internal sales were so limited by 
the  price  ceilings  on  its  output,  YPFB  also  refused  to  pay  taxes  on  its 
external sales, arguing that the revenues were necessary to meet operating 
expenses. 
It is much more difficult to offer a comprehensive account of expenditure 
behavior  during the  hyperinflation, for reasons to  which  we  have  already 
alluded. As a rough estimate, however, it seems that as government revenues 
diminished, real expenditures fell more or less in tandem to preserve a large 
but fairly constant deficit, since we know that the inflation tax, which was 
financing almost 100 percent of  the cash-flow deficit, did not rise markedly 
above 12 percent of  GDP from 1982 to mid-1985. It appears that the main 
casualties of  the reduction in real spending were capital investment by  the 
public sector and current central government expenditures on personnel and 
nonpersonnel services and materials. After mid- 1984, interest payments on 
the foreign debt also diminished sharply as the government built  up  large 
interest arrears. Public investment spending fell, according to the IMF, in the 
manner shown in table 6.5. 
Table 6.4  Domestic Price of Gasoline ($/liter), March-December  1986 
March  $.09 
April  .07 
June  .05 
July  .03 
August  .04 
September  .28 
October  .21 
November  .23 
December  .23 
May  .06 
Source: UDAPE,  Bolivian Ministry of  Planning. 
Nore:  The price is calculated by dividing the peso price per liter by the black-market exchange rate (pesos/$). 233  BolividChapter 6 
'IBble 6.5  Public Investment (percentage of  GNP), 1980-85 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Central administration  2.9  3.1  I .9  1.8  1.5  1.8 
State enterprises  4.6  3.0  2.6  1.4 
Total  6.5  4.8  4.1  3.2 
Source:  Unpublished IMF memorandum on Bolivia,  1985. 
Current  spending  by  the  TGN  evolved  in  a  similar  way,  with  overall 
spending on services and materials falling from 9.4 percent of GNP in 1980 
to 6.8 percent  in the first part of 1985. 
6.2  The Dynamics of the Hyperinflation 
This  section  is  devoted  to  a  closer  look  at  the  dynamics  of  the 
hyperinflation.  To  organize  the  discussion,  we  begin  with  the  simple  and 
classic Cagan (1956) model.  Real money balances (M,/P,)  are written as an 
exponential  function  of  expected  inflation  d,  and  inflation  expectations 
adjust adaptively: 
The government's  reliance on seignorage taxation is denoted by s 7  MIP, 
which may also be written asm + nm(ne),  with m  = MIP, and r = P/P. In 
the steady state, s = nm(n), which as is well known can be satisfied by rwo 
inflation rates, a low inflation rate nmin  = nrnin($)  and a high inflation rate 
7~~~~  = nmax(s)  for all s S Pax,  the maximal seignorage rate. The maximal 
rate is achieved at the inflatipn rate n = l/b, with smax  = m(l/b)/b. Given 
the relations in (1) and that M/P = s G s  max ,  an economy starting at t  = 0 
will converge to mmIn(s) assuming that ~'(0)  S  T~~~(s)  and that  1 > bX. 
In  the  important  case  in  which  s > smax  and  in  which  the  stability 
condition  1 > bX  is satisfied, then starting from a finite expected  inflation 
rate, actual inflation will rise steadily without bound. At any given moment, 
the actual seignorage s  can be financed through a surprise inflation, in which 
actual inflation exceeds the expected inflation rate.  But this continuing gap 
between  actual  and expected  inflation  continues  to  drive  up the  expected 
inflation rate, which  in turn increases  the actual inflation  rate necessary to 
achieve  the  given  level  of  seignorage.  Inflation  proceeds  to  increase  ex- 
plosively  and without bound. 
One key property of the Cagan model should be stressed: starting from a 
steady state with no = nmin(so),  a permanent rise from so to s1 will lead to a 
jump in n  on impact, and then to a steadily rising inflation rate. If s1 is less 234  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
than smm,  then a new higher steady state,  IT"""(s,),  is reached. If  instead s1 
is greater than Pax,  then inflation jumps up on impact and continues to rise 
without bound. In either case, a period in which inflation is rising need not 
signify a  rising  financing need  (i.e.,  a continuing rise  in  s),  but  rather a 
lagged adjustment of the inflation rate to an earlier once-and-for-all increase 
in s. 
This essential aspect of  the model characterizes the Bolivian experience, 
as  we  have  already  seen  in  figure  6.1.  Aside  from  seasonal  spikes  in 
seignorage in the fourth quarter of most of the years (for budgetary reasons 
associated with a Christmas wage bonus), there is basically one permanent 
step increase in the seignorage collection in  1982, which persists until the 
third quarter of  1985. 
This model can easily be extended to the open economy by  postulating a 
law-of-one-price  (or  purchasing-power-parity)  relation  between  domestic 
prices, foreign prices,  and the exchange rate.  Specifically, we  can assume 
P, = PT-  E,,  where  P*  is  foreign (dollar) prices  and  E  is  the  exchange 
rate  in  units  of  pesos  per  dollar.  Given  the  path  of  foreign  prices  and 
seignorage demands,  we  can  solve  for  domestic  prices  and  the  nominal 
exchange rate. 
This simple extension model of  monetary and price dynamics introduced 
earlier must be modified in one important respect in the case of  Bolivia. We 
have seen that throughout the hyperinflation period, foreign exchange was 
rationed at the official exchange rate, so that a large black-market premium 
was present throughout the period. In order to understand the dynamics of 
prices  with  a  black-market  exchange  rate,  it  is  necessary  to  alter  the 
purchasing-power-parity relation  to  reflect  the  fact  that  the  black-market 
exchange rate, rather than the official rate, best reflects the marginal cost of 
foreign exchanges for most imports during the period. For a limited subset of 
"necessary"  imports,  official  foreign  exchange  was  available  from  the 
Central Bank without rationing. The official exchange rate applied, for most 
of the period, to newsprint and pharmaceutical imports, for example. For all 
other  goods,  limited  amounts  of  imports  were  purchased  at  the  official 
exchange rate, but on the margin the cost of  foreign exchange was dictated 
by  the black-market price rather than by  the official price. As a result, we 
should expect that the price level would be a weighted average of the official 
exchange rate (E)  and the black market exchange rate  (l?) price of  foreign 
exchange, so that 
As  before,  monetary  equilibrium  requires  MIP  = m(rr"). Using  the 
convenient Cagan form for money demand used earlier, assuming adaptive 
expectations for inflation in a discrete-time setting, IT:  = IT;-, + (1)  and 
A(n, -   IT;-^), and taking the logs of  (2),  we can write: 235  BolividChapter 6 
(3)  pt -  ye, - (1 -  y)Zt = Xu  -  bhT, 
+ (1 -  A) (Pr-1 -  pr-11, 
where a  = log A, p = log M,  e  = log E,  p  = log P,  and log P* = 0. By 
rearranging, we  get  an  estimable equation for the  black-market premium 
(2 -  e)  as an increasing function of (p - e),  as well as a rising function of 
inflation and a negative function of  (log) real balances lagged one period: 
(4)  (E, -  e,) =  -ha/(l -  y) + [l/(l - y)](p, -  e,) 
+ [bX/(1 - y)I~r 
-  “1  - X)/(1 -  Y)I(Pt-I -  Pt-1) 
An  estimate  of  equation  (4)  using  monthly  data  for  January  1982  to 
September 1985 is strongly supportive of  this monetary interpretation of  the 
black-market premium. The estimated equation is3 
(5)  (a, -  e,) = 3.03 + l.lO(p - e) 
(0.24)  (0.08) 
+ 0.57 T, -  0.58(~-~  -  pp1) 
(0.17)  (0.10) 
R2 = 0.84; D.W.  = 1.26; s.e.  = 0.27. 
The point estimate on (p -  e)  of 1.10 suggests that the black-market exchange 
rate gets a weight y of 0.9 in determining the price level. This high weight is 
broadly consistent with direct estimates for prices, to which we now turn. 
6.2.1 
The  microdynamics  of  wages,  prices,  and  exchange  rates  changed 
markedly over the course of  the inflation. During the early 1980s, nominal 
wages were changed only a few times a year, and the presence of  staggered 
nominal  wage  settlements gave inertia  to  the  wage-price process.  As  in- 
flation  accelerated,  wage contracts were  renegotiated on  a  more  frequent 
basis until, by the end of the hyperinflation, nominal wages were being reset 
on a weekly or biweekly schedule. As for prices, an increasing proportion of 
transactions became dollar linked in the sense that traders quoted prices in 
dollars, converting into pesos (at the parallel exchange rate) at the time of 
the  transactions.  It  was  illegal  during  this  period  to  use  dollars  for 
transactions or even to quote items in dollars, so that  in most parts of  the 
country (with the important exception of  the Santa Cruz region), dollariza- 
tion stopped short of actual transactions in U.S. dollars. 
A precise specification of  price-exchange  rate linkages would open up a 
number of econometric and conceptual issues better left to another study. 
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Here, the process of encroaching  “dollarization”  is shown more simply in 
an equation  linking  monthly  inflation  to a one-month  lag  of  inflation, the 
change  in  the  black-market  exchange  rate,  and  the  change in  the  official 
exchange rate. The equation to be estimated is: 
(6)  (P, -  &I)  = a0  + a,(p,-, -  PI-2)  + a,(& -  Zr-1) 
+ a3kr -  (?,-,I 
All variables are expressed as monthly averages, where the monthly average 
exchange rates for month t are proxied  by the geometric weighted averages 
of end-of-month rates for months t- 1 and t. 
There  are  two  maintained  hypotheses:  (1)  as  inflation  accelerates,  the 
weight of the exchange rates in the price equations increases relative to the 
weight of the previous month’s inflation; and (2) as inflation accelerates and 
as  the  black-market  premium  increases  (see  table  6.3),  the  black-market 
exchange rate increases in importance relative to the official exchange rate. 
Thus, we expect that a,/(a,  +a,+a,)  and a,l(a,  +a,) will  both  fall  as the 
hyperinflation  intensifies. 
Estimates  of  (6)  are  shown  in  table  6.6,  first  under  an  unrestricted 
estimation of the parameters, and then under the restriction a,  +  a2  +a,  = 1. 
The hypotheses are supported  in  each case. The average  monthly  inflation 
rates for the three intervals are: 1983, 13.2; 1984, 31.4; 1985, 66.9. We see 
clearly that  as we move  from  1983 to  1985 the weight of  lagged inflation 
(even at a one-month lag!) disappears,  while the weight of the black-market 
exchange  rate  grows  in  importance.  In  the  final  eight  months  of  the 
hyperinflation,  price  change is basically  equiproportional  to change  of  the 
black-market exchange rate. 
The combination  of  equations  (5) and  (6) illustrates the  utter  futility of 
the  government’s  policy  of  maintaining  an  overvalued  official  exchange 
rate under conditions of rapid money creation. The government’s resistance 
to devaluation  was  ostensibly  owing to the fear of  provoking  even  higher 
inflation,  but  it  is clear that  money  creation  fed  into  prices  even  in  the 
absence  of  devaluation,  through  the  mechanism  of  depreciation  of  the 
black-market  exchange  rate.  The  maintenance  of  an overvalued  official 
exchange  rate  did  nothing  to  stop  inflation.  On  the  contrary,  it  not  only 
created large distortions  in the economy  (particularly  by  acting as a tax on 
legal  exports),  but  almost  surely  raised  inflation  by  increasing  the 
government  deficit  via  its  negative  effects  on  tariff  collections  and  other 
revenues. 
6.3  Failed Attempts to End the Hyperinflation 
As with many other hyperinflations, the end did not come on the first try, 
but  only  after  several  attempts  at  stabilization  had  failed.  Stabilization 
programs  were launched  in  November  1982, November  1983, April  1984, 237  BolividChapter 6 
Table 6.6  Price Inflation Equations 
1. Unconstrained estimation  (monthly) 
l983:l- 1983:  12 
1984:l- 1984:  12 
1985:l-1985:9 
2. Constrained Estimation 
l983:l- 1983:  12 
1984:l- 1984:12 
.33  .18  .20  .46  .47 
(.27)  (.11j  (.I3 
R2  =  .42  D.W.  = 1.76 
.13  .32  .52 
(S2)  (.II)  (.19) 
R2  =  .58  D.W. = 2.80 
-.I8  .I7  1.04  - 
(.17)  (.13j  (.16) 
R2 = .87  D.W.  = 2.20 
.57  .I6  .27 
(.11)  (.13j 
R2 = .42  D.W.  = 1.97 
.13  .38 
.17  .14 
.57  .37 
.I6  .31  .53  .16  .37 
(.lo)  (.11) 
R2 =  .71  D.W.  = 2.83 
1985:  1 -  1985:8  -.20  .17  1.03  -  .20  .14 
(.11)  (.lo) 
R2 = .94  D.W.  = 2.18 
August  1984,  November  1984,  and  February  1985.  The  most  ambitious 
programs were those of  November 1982 and April  1984. Notably, the April 
1984 package represented a fairly orthodox  approach to  stabilization that 
included some of the measures that later proved successful in August  1985. 
The package included a very large devaluation of the official exchange rate, 
an announcement of  tax reform, and a major increase in public sector debt. 
In the event, the trade unions exploded in furious opposition to the program, 
and  a month  later, the government acceded to demands for a large wage 
increase to compensate for the devaluation. At  the same time, the govern- 
ment  reversed its  debt policy  under the pressure of  the  trade unions  and 
entered into  a unilateral  moratorium on  further  servicing of  the  external 
commercial banks debt. The Siles government gave up further attempts to 
negotiate a package of debt rescheduling. 
The  complete  breakdown  of  the  April  1984 package  eliminated  any 
remaining hopes of the public that the Siles government would prove able to 
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President Siles was compelled to announce elections for July  1985, one year 
ahead of schedule.  A final attempt at stabilization came in February  1985, 
with a program that prompted a domestic march to La Paz and a month-long 
sit-in  by  10,000  miners.  Again  the  government  capitulated  to  popular 
demands, after which it gave up even the pretense of attempting to stabilize 
before the arrival of  a new government in August. 
7  Ending the Hyperinflation, 
1985-88 
The end of the  hyperinflation  came swiftly, just three  weeks after the new 
government  of  Victor  Paz  Estenssoro  took  office.  A  comprehensive  sta- 
bilization  program,  labelled  the  New  Economic  Policy,  was  unveiled  on 
29 August  1985, and within days, the hyperinflation  ended. Later in  1985, 
after several weeks of low inflation, there was another sharp run-up in prices 
associated with a large emission of money at the end of the year, but this blip 
in inflation was quickly brought under control in mid-January  1986. 
7.1  The New Economic Policy 
The main  features of  the New  Economic  Policy  are shown in table 7.1. 
Note the program embraced widespread liberalization of trade and finance, as 
well  as fiscal austerity.  In principle,  the  stabilization measures are “short- 
term”  measures,  while  the  liberalization  measures  are  oriented  toward 
“long-run”  growth.  In fact, as we discuss  later, the  Bolivian  government 
believes,  with considerable reason, that the liberalization measures played  a 
key role in permitting the stabilization policies to take hold. 
The  key  stabilization  measures  (putting  aside,  for  the  moment,  the 
question  of  liberalization policies)  had  four  basic  elements,  two  of  which 
were  to  be  implemented  immediately  and  two  of  which  were  slated  for 
implementation in the months following the beginning of the program. First, 
the  government  committed  itself  to  a  policy  of  a  unified  exchange rate, 
without  capital  controls  or  exchange  controls.  The  exchange  rate  was 
initially  floated,  though with  a maximum  value of  the peso beyond  which 
peso appreciation would not be permitted,  and then was managed in a dirty 
float during the  following year.  Second, the  fiscal deficit  was  immediately 
reduced  through  a  combination  of  (a)  public  sector price  increases,  es- 
pecially  for petroleum products; (b) a public sector wage freeze; (c) further 